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1 
Can We Measure Who Loses Most 
from Public Service Spending Cuts? 
 
Abstract 
The fiscal tightening currently under way in Ireland, as in many other countries, 
comprises cuts to spending on public services (transfers in kind) as well as cuts to 
benefits and increases in taxation (transfers and charges in cash). Unlike with 
changes to taxes and cash benefits there is no standard methodology for 
assessing which groups in society lose most from changes to spending on public 
services. Therefore distributional analyses of government ‘cash’ decisions are 
common while those relating to ‘in-kind’ decisions are rare. This paper considers 
the reasons for this, sets out some issues which must be tackled in modelling the 
impact of changes to public service spending and discusses some approaches that 
are being undertaken in other countries. We highlight the fact that such a 
modelling exercise will yield only imprecise result.  Finally, we assess whether it is 
worth developing a model of the distributional impact of changes to public 
services in Ireland. 
  
2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The fiscal tightening ongoing in Ireland comprises a combination of net increases 
in taxation, cuts to spending on cash benefits and cuts to spending on public 
services. These measures, as they reduce government borrowing, will inevitably 
involve a reduction in the resources available to households. Given their scale, an 
understanding of how the impact of each is distributed across the population is 
important. 
 
Distributional analyses of changes to taxation and the payment of cash benefits 
are frequently produced (in Ireland and elsewhere)1 and follow an established 
methodology2. For reasons that we discuss in this paper, distributional analyses 
of changes to spending on public services (health, education, physical 
infrastructure, government administration etc.) are much less common. 
However, the recent large cuts to departmental budgets have sparked a good 
deal of interest in this recently, in the UK, Ireland and elsewhere. The issue is not, 
however, new: the absence of any modelling of the distributional impact of 
changes to public service spending was just as much an omission in the 
evaluation of fiscal plans during earlier times of expanding public expenditure. 
 
The comments above are in no sense particular to Ireland. Elsewhere, on the cash 
side, tax and benefit models are also used in policy formation by governments 
and in policy evaluation by those outside government. Also, formal analysis of the 
distributional impact of the recent cuts to spending on public services have been 
rare internationally, just as they were absent in times of increasing spending. 
Recently though, there have been some models developed and we discuss one 
such model (that of the UK Treasury). We do not discuss this by way of a 
recommendation that an exact replica should be produced for Ireland – indeed 
there is much that we would like to see done differently – but as an example of 
what could be done, what issues would have to be considered in designing a 
model, what the results would look like, what caveats would have to be attached 
to these results and what insights could be drawn from them. We hope this can 
contribute to a discussion about whether such an endeavor would be a 
worthwhile use of resources in Ireland. 
 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the considerable difficulties in 
evaluating precisely the distributional impact of public services that are provided 
 
1  For a recent example in Ireland, UK and a selection of European countries (though not including Ireland) respectively 
see Callan et al. (2013), Section 7.5 of Joyce and Phillips (2013) and Avram et al. (2013). 
2  For an overview of this methodology see Hancock and Sutherland (1992) and Redmond et al. (1998). 
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in kind rather than in cash. Section 3 turns to a description of the model that the 
UK Treasury have developed that attempts to look at the distributional impact of 
changes in such spending. Section 4 concludes. 3 
 
2. CAN WE MEASURE THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF SPENDING ON 
PUBLIC SERVICES? 
What is the monetary value to a household of spending on a local school? Or a 
local hospital? Or a new motorway? Or the Department of Finance? These are the 
type of questions that must be answered in quantitative terms if one wants to 
evaluate quantitatively and compare the distributional impact of spending on 
schools, hospitals, roads or any government department. 
 
The impact of public service spending decisions is substantially harder to 
document precisely than decisions that relate to taxation or the payment of cash 
benefits. To see why consider the following two questions: 
1. Who loses most, and how much do they lose, from a cut to child benefit? 
2. Who loses most, and how much do they lose, from a cut to spending on the 
health service? 
 
The part of the question that asks “how much do they lose” calls for the answer 
to be expressed in quantitative terms. The first of these questions is much easier 
to answer precisely. In assessing the effect of a cut in child benefit on households, 
the obvious answer is a quantitative one – the amount (in euro per week, for 
example) that the household has lost. In assessing the effect of a cut in spending 
on the health service, on the other hand, it may be possible to identify who has 
been affected but there is no uncontroversial or readily calculable quantitative 
measure of the loss each household experiences. Cuts to spending on public 
services typically have no direct cash impact on households, but the welfare of 
households will, of course, be affected. The size of the impact will depend on, 
among other things, the amount of the service a household uses and how much 
they value the service. If a quantitative assessment of the distributional impact of 
that spending cut is required in a way that allows comparison to other budgetary 
changes then that reduction in welfare must be expressed in cash terms.  
 
This raises the question of why one would want to express quantitatively 
something (like the value of public services) that has no simple quantitative 
 
3  A more detailed treatment of the same issues is considered in O’Dea and Preston (2010). 
4 
interpretation.4 There are a number of reasons. First, it is necessary if one wants 
to compare the distributional impact of cuts to spending on public services with 
cuts to benefit payments or increases in taxation. Second, it allows a comparison 
of the distributional impact of changes to various types of public service spending 
(e.g., closing libraries compared with closing hospitals). Putting these together, it 
would allow a distributional analysis of an entire fiscal consolidation or expansion, 
i.e., an assessment of the progressivity or regressivity of all measures introduced 
(including both those with a cash effect and those with an in-kind effect). If all 
else is equal then modelling the impact of the full set of government decisions is 
better than only a particular subset of them – doing the latter could give a 
misleading impression of the true impact of these decisions on households.  
 
In the rest of this section we first discuss a relatively intellectually satisfying (but 
perhaps impractical) approach to the valuation of public services. This equates a 
user’s value of a public service with what their willingness to pay for it would be 
were it not provided publicly. We then discuss a less than ideal (but more 
practical and therefore more common) approach to the valuation of public 
services. This equates the value to the user with the cost of provision. 
 
2.1 Value as ‘Willingness to Pay’ 
A natural way to think about valuation, we suggest, is to think about the 
willingness to pay. To value the services provided by a library, for example, we 
could evaluate how much households would have been willing to pay for its 
services if it were not provided by the government. Or if we want to assess the 
impact of a cut in the library’s funding we could evaluate how much households 
would have been willing to pay to avoid that funding cut.  
 
There are a variety of methods that could be informative about the willingness to 
pay for some public services. For example: 
• The premium paid for a house with easy access to a public amenity (e.g., a 
good school, public park or transport hub) relative to a similar house with no 
such access can be used to assess willingness to pay for that amenity. For 
examples of this type of research see Gibbons and Machin (2003 and 2008). 
 
4  The danger of thinking that "any number is better than no number" is an obvious one. For a perspective that argues 
that, in the context of goods that are consumed collectively, no number might be often better than some number, 
see: Diamond and Hausman (1994).  
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• For some publicly provided goods, relatively close substitutes exist whose 
market price can be used to assess valuations. A leading example of this is 
health insurance, the price of which can be used to inform an exercise which 
aims to value public health care.   
• Some surveys contain questions that try directly to elicit valuation by asking 
respondents how much they would be willing to pay for some hypothetical 
expansion of government spending on some public service or whether they 
would be willing to pay a given amount. For an example see Hall and Preston 
(1998). 
 
There are issues, which we do not discuss here, that make each of these 
strategies far from perfect. However, if the aim is to value the overall 
distributional impact of public spending their greatest weakness is their limited 
applicability. None of these methods can easily be applied to place a value on 
every public service, nor can they be applied to assess the distributional impact of 
a package of spending cuts at the level of detail announced on Budget day. The 
latter typically sets out the budgets available to departments rather than on 
which programmes and services on which those budgets will ultimately be spent. 
However, it is those programmes and services that can (potentially) be valued 
using a willingness to pay measure, rather than the budgets themselves. 
 
2.2 Value as the Cost of Provision 
In light of the absence of any method to estimate willingness to pay for all public 
services it is perhaps unsurprising that all the studies that have recently 
attempted to assess the value of spending on public services equate the value to 
the cost of provision. We briefly discuss a selection of these papers below. The 
approach typically taken is as follows. An estimate of which types of households 
use a particular public service is made. The cost is then divided equally between 
the users and the resulting cost per user is assumed equal to the value per user. 
This approach, while certainly feasible, is problematic. We now outline two 
problems with this approach. 
 
2.2.1 Value and Cost Diverge 
The fact that value and cost diverge can be illustrated by a stark example. At one 
extreme, there is likely to be some government spending that is considered to be 
worthless or even destructive by some households. For example, governments 
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often state an intention to cut ‘wasteful’ expenditure.5 Since waste is costly, 
defining value based on cost would lead to the conclusion that cutting waste in 
the provision of public services reduces their value to the end user. In this case, 
the notion of value as willingness to pay seems more sensible as, presumably, 
households will have no willingness to pay for waste, and it would therefore be 
assigned a zero value.  
 
2.2.2 The Value of Public Services Will Not be the Same for All Users 
The second concern with directly equating cost and valuation is that it implies 
that the value is the same to all those who use a public service of similar cost. In 
fact, there is good reason to believe that the valuation of certain public services 
will vary with household characteristics and, in particular, household income. This 
is a crucial issue when the question at hand relates to the extent to which 
government spending has a different impact on those at different points of the 
income distribution. If users with different incomes value the (similar) service 
they receive differently then assigning everyone the same value will yield 
misleading results. This can be illustrated with two examples that highlight why 
intuitive and apparently innocuous assumptions can lead to results that seem 
questionable. 
 
First consider the case of spending on the environment. Without any way of 
assessing ‘usage’ of the environment, perhaps the most obvious approach is to 
assume that everyone benefits to the same extent. If everyone is assigned the 
same cash valuation, those at the bottom of the income distribution get more 
value from the environment as a proportion of their income. Spending on the 
environment therefore will seem to be progressive,6 and any cut in 
environmental expenditure will appear regressive. While this may or may not be 
true, the combination of this conclusion (environmental spending is progressive) 
and the initial assumption (all individuals benefit equally) highlights the fact that 
equal cash valuation of some public service across the income distribution is not 
the same as saying that the impact of spending on that service is distributionally 
neutral.7  
 
5  We can distinguish between two different types of waste. First there is ‘pure waste’ (e.g., leaving the lights on in 
government offices at night) which benefits nobody. Second there is paying people to do things that are not 
considered socially valuable. The latter type of expenditure is often labelled ‘waste’ and while it does not create any 
value for users of public services it does benefit the recipient of the payment. Its effect, therefore, is rather like a 
transfer payment. The discussion in the text here relates primarily to ‘pure waste’. 
6  Where the definition of progressivity is taken to be that the value of the benefits as a proportion of income falls as 
incomes rise, that of neutrality is that the value of the benefits as a proportion of income is constant, and that of 
regressivity is taken to be that the value of the benefits as a proportion of income rises as income rises. 
7  Another way to think about this is to note that "progressivity" in spending is not the same as "equal benefits" any 
more than progressivity in taxes is the same as equal tax payments. 
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The second example is one where the concept of usage is easier to define than in 
the case of spending on the environment. Consider two families with different 
income levels, both with a child in a local school which is facing a funding cut. 
Both families can be considered to be ‘using’ the school to the same extent. 
However, it is quite possible that even if both sets of parents share the same 
sense of the importance of education to their children the richer of the two 
families will be willing to pay more than the poorer family to avoid the cut in the 
school’s funding, simply because they can afford to.  
 
These examples suggest that if one is satisfied to put a value on public service 
spending that is informed by the notion of willingness to pay then cash valuations 
should rise with income, at least up to some particular level of income. This is not 
to suggest, however, that valuation increases with income throughout the 
income distribution. As incomes continue to rise individuals become more likely 
to supplement public provision with private provision of a close substitute and in 
a more extreme case, opt out of public provision altogether and rely entirely on 
privately provided alternatives. Once incomes get to the stage that individuals 
start supplementing public provision with private alternatives, valuations will stop 
rising. If individuals opt out of public provision altogether – say, by sending their 
children to a private school, rather than the local state school – then their 
valuation of spending on state schools could well be zero. 
 
It is very important to emphasise that the fact that value (as defined by 
willingness to pay) may increase with income over some range does not imply 
that services provided to richer households are more valuable from the 
perspective of society or should carry more weight in policymakers’ decisions. In 
policymaking, a social welfare function will be applied (albeit not formally) to any 
distributional analysis that will likely place a greater weight on transfers and 
services on lower income households than on higher income households. 
 
To summarise this discussion we have outlined the following: cash valuations 
placed on public services are likely to vary over the income distribution; even 
with the same preferences, those with more income will be willing to pay more.  
Assuming that value and cost are equal will mean that this variation in value will 
be missed. 
 
2.2.3 Some ‘Mitigating Factors’ to the Equating of Cost and Value 
The previous discussion outlined many reasons not to use cost as the basis for 
valuation. However, the practical difficulty of adequately ascertaining willingness 
to pay means that if the aim is to value either the current level of, or the change 
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in, spending on a variety of different public programmes (such as the decisions 
contained in the Budget), cost is perhaps the only feasible starting point.8 
 
Given the fact that the previous discussion was quite clear on the problems 
associated with using the cost of provision as a measure of value, here we note 
three of the ways in which the problems that are associated with such an 
approach might be mitigated. 
  
First, studies that take this approach typically correct for differential usage of 
public services across the income distribution. Differential usage is one (though 
only one) of the reasons why value might differ across the income distribution.9  
 
Second, under certain assumptions, there is likely to be a point in the income 
distribution where the cost of provision is equal to the willingness to pay. 10 This 
insight, combined with evidence gleaned from other sources on how valuations 
vary with income, could, in principle, be used to estimate a valuation for all 
households that, while depending on the cost of provision, is not exactly equal to 
that cost. However, the studies that we have seen do not attempt anything like 
this. They typically divide the cost of provision by the number of users and assign 
the same cash valuation to each user. 
 
Third, some studies attempt to estimate the value of a change in spending on 
services rather than the current level of public spending. Unless the political 
system is considered to be completely dysfunctional, it is probably the case for 
some items of expenditure (such as those where the relationship between value 
and cost is reasonably smooth) that the average valuation of a particular change 
is not too far from the average change in the cost of provision. Information from 
other sources on the relationship between cost and value can then be used in 
conjunction with this (roughly correct) average figure to estimate the 
distributional impact. 
 
 
8  At least the cost of everything is relatively amenable to measurement. However, the economist may be in danger of 
being someone who miscalculates the value of everything because he is not satisfied with knowing the cost of 
everything. 
9  Defining and estimating usage of public services is itself not free from difficulties. Issues include whether to define the 
benefits of certain public services (health for example) as accruing to those who access them in a particular period, or 
as insurance benefits which accrue to everyone in each period and whether to measure use of public services over the 
lifecycle or in a particular period. We do not discuss these issues here but a detailed discussion is contained in Section 
2.5 of O’Dea and Preston (2010). 
10  See section 2.1 of O’Dea and Preston (2010). 
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Finally, while it should be clear that the cost of provision is not the same as the 
value to the recipient, ascertaining the areas of the income distribution which 
receive greater or lesser shares of public spending is arguably a well-formed 
question and one to which the answer is informative, as long as it is interpreted 
appropriately. 
 
2.2.4  Studies Evaluating Distributional Impact of the Public Services Using 
 Input Cost Approach 
Many existing and ongoing studies evaluate the distributional impact of spending 
on public services (the term Social Transfers In Kind (STIKS) is sometimes used to 
describe such spending) using the approach of assuming that input cost is equal 
to the value to the user. These include an annual publication in the UK by the 
Office for National Statistics (the most recent edition of which was published in 
2013), a paper that implements a similar procedure in Ireland Callan and Keane 
(2009) on health and some non-compulsory education expenditures, and an 
ongoing programme of work at the World Bank looking at a developing and 
middle income countries (see Lustig et al. 2013). Cross national studies on OECD 
countries, including Ireland, have been undertaken by Verbist et al. (2012) and on 
a selection of European countries include Paulus et al (2010) and Aaberge et al. 
(2010) (though neither paper considers Ireland). Also, the Australian Survey of 
Income and Housing microdata is now published with estimates of the value of 
STIKS at the individual household level.  
 
These studies typically only model the distributional impact of public services 
where differential use across households can be identified (so they, for example, 
typically include health but not environmental spending).11 The studies also 
typically do not take into account the fact that greater spending focused on a 
particular part of the income distribution might be as a result of differing needs. 
For example, poorer people tend, in many countries, to use public health care to 
a greater extent than richer households, but this is, at least partly, as a result of 
poorer people tending to be unhealthier. Ignoring the fact that some greater 
spending is simply as a result of pre-existing inequalities whose effect is not 
adequately represented by income statistics will over-state the well-being of 
more needy recipients relative to those less in need of that particular spending. 
 
Notwithstanding these caveats, and the caveats around assuming that value is 
equal to cost, the redistributive impact of the government interventions 
 
11  We are aware of two attempts to allocate the remainder of government expenditure in the UK to households. These 
are Volterra Consulting (2009), and Horton and Reed (2010). 
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modelled in these studies is clear. Those at the bottom of the income distribution 
receive a substantially greater share of their total access to resources from the 
state. Those at the top of the income distribution, on average, receive only a very 
small proportion of their total income in terms of services in kind from the 
state.12 
 
The studies referenced above mean that, if we are willing to accept cost of 
provision as a valid metric for the value to a recipient of a service, there is quite a 
lot that is known (and more that can be known) about the distributional impact of 
in kind transfers.   
 
2.3 The Value of the Level of Spending on Public Services Versus the 
Value of Changes to Spending on Public Services 
It is worth emphasising one further point on how both methods of valuation 
discussed above can – or cannot – be used to evaluate the distributional impacts 
of changes in spending on public services, such as those announced in a Budget 
statement. It will not necessarily be the case that the distributional impact of the 
change in spending on that service will mirror the distributional impact of the 
existing level of public expenditure on it. For example, simply because health 
spending tends to be progressive does not mean that every conceivable 
reduction in health spending is regressive. There are likely to be individual parts 
of health spending that are either regressive, or at least less progressive than 
health spending as a whole. It is, therefore, clearly possible for the distributional 
impact of a change in health spending to bear little relation to the distributional 
impact of the current level of health spending.  
 
Take a specific example: the potential introduction of free GP care for the under-
six age group would likely have a very different distributional impact to the 
distributional impact of the current level of public spending on GP care. The fact 
that the poorest households are those exempt from GP fees makes current public 
spending on GP care in Ireland progressive. Free GP care to the under-sixes would 
not benefit such households – and the beneficiaries would be located further up 
the distribution.  
 
 
12  The studies referenced above model the impact of spending on several public services. Additionally, there is a wealth 
of research that looks at the distributional impact of individual public services (e.g., health, education, police etc.). For 
a summary of this literature see Section 3 of O’Dea and Preston (2010). 
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The precise composition and manner of implementation of a package of spending 
cuts will be of crucial importance in determining how progressive or regressive 
they are. This level of detail will not generally be included in a fiscal statement 
such as the Budget, in part because much of the requisite detail might not be 
decided for some time. This fact should warn against estimating the value of the 
current level of public expenditure and then inferring from these estimates the 
distributional impact of a package of changes to spending on public services. If 
the distributional impact of a change in spending on public services is of primary 
interest, then every possible effort should be made to estimate the impact of that 
change directly, rather than being informed by estimates of the distributional 
effects of the existing level of spending on public services. The devil will be in the 
detail. 
 
3.  THE UK TREASURY’S MODEL OF THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF 
SPENDING ON PUBLIC SERVICES 
In this section, we summarise the methodology and results coming from the UK 
Treasury’s (reasonably) new model which they use during the policy formation 
process and which is used to publish their assessment of the distributional impact 
of fiscal statements.13 The Treasury have for many years had a model (IGOTM, 
similar to the ESRI’s SWITCH and the IFS’s TAXBEN) that attempts to measure the 
distributional impact of changes to taxes and cash benefits. What is new is the 
facility to assess the distributional impact of changes to spending on public 
services. 
 
Such a model is rare internationally (indeed possibly unique – we are not aware 
of any other government that has undertaken to develop a comparable model) in 
the sense that it aims to look at the distributional impact of changes to spending 
on public services. However, at its core is actually a model of the distributional 
impact of the level of spending on public services. The approach taken, for 
expenditure on health care (as an example), is as follows: 
1. A variety of data sources are used to estimate the extent to which those in 
different parts of the income distribution use publicly-provided health care 
services.  
2. The total benefit from health care spending (which is set equal to total cost 
spending) is assigned across the income distribution in proportion to that 
estimated differential usage.   
 
13  Fiscal statements in the UK are the annual budget (which takes place in March), the ‘Autumn Statement’ (which 
despite its name most recently was delivered in December 2013) and the (approximately tri-annual) Spending Review 
at which departmental spending settlements are determined for the subsequent number of years. 
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3. Changes in spending on health care are assumed to affect households in 
direct proportion to the extent to which they currently benefit.14  
 
As discussed above, there is absolutely no guarantee that this last step will give a 
reasonable estimate of the change in valuations, even if we set aside concerns 
about equating value and cost. 
 
The first results from the model were presented alongside the Spending Review 
in 2010 and each fiscal statement since has contained an updated set of results.  
 
The approach taken by the Treasury shares many features with that taken in the 
studies discussed above. In particular, value is assumed to be equal to the cost of 
provision, and only expenditure on items where it was considered that the end-
user could be identified were modelled. As a result of the latter restriction just 
over half of (current and capital) spending on public services15 were included in 
the analysis carried out, over 80 per cent of which was spending on either health 
or education.16 The modelled components, however, account for a much smaller 
proportion of the change in spending on public services. The fact that the 
proportion of the change in expenditure modelled is substantially less than the 
proportion of the current level of expenditure modelled comes from the fact that 
health expenditure makes up over half of the level of expenditure that is 
modelled but was an area that has been protected from real cuts since the 
current government in the UK came into office (2010). At the time of the 
Spending Review in 2010 the modelled expenditures represented about one-third 
of the changes in spending on public services. The Treasury have not published 
sufficient detail for us to update this figure17 – though it is likely not to have 
greatly changed. 
 
Figure 1 shows the Treasury’s analysis of the distributional impact of the 
modelled cuts to spending on public services. It gives the proportionate fall in 
value obtained from the modelled components as a proportion of their total 
 
14  There a few small exceptions to this – i.e., cases where a particular change in expenditure has been explicitly 
modelled. A recent extension to free school meals is an example of this. 
15  We are using the terms spending on public services here as a shorthand for ‘Departmental Expenditure Limits’ (DELs). 
UK government spending is divided into Annually Managed Expenditure (largely social security payments, payment on 
debt interest, net pension payments to public servants and some local government expenditure) which, as the name 
suggests, are determined annually and Departmental Expenditure Limits (the cash available for departments to 
provide public services). 
16  Excluded was almost all capital expenditure, spending on ‘pure public goods’ such as defence and environmental 
protection and central government administration costs.  
17  However, one could carry out a back of the envelope calculation get an approximation to the answer. 
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income (defined as net cash income plus the value of modelled public spending) 
relative to a baseline of no real change in DELs.  
 
The biggest proportionate losers are those in the bottom income quintile. The 
proportionate falls are roughly similar for those in each of the four upper income 
quintiles. 
 
FIGURE 1  UK Treasury Analysis of Impact of Planned Cuts in Spending on Public Services Between 2010/11 
and 2015/16 
 
Note:  Income quintiles groups are derived by dividing all households into 5 equal-sized groups according to income 
adjusted for household size using the McClements (before housing costs) equivalence scale. Quintile group 1 
contains the poorest fifth of the population, quintile group 2 the second poorest, and so on up to quintile 
group 5, which contains the richest fifth. 
Sources: Chart 2I, UK Budget 2014: Impact on households: distributional analysis to accompany Budget 2014, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/293738/budget_2014_dist
ributional_analysis.pdf 
 
 
Figure 2 show a similar graph with data presented using the first published set of 
results – those released alongside Spending Review 2010 which showed the 
distributional impact of the planned spending cuts up to 2014/15 – a horizon that 
ends one year before that in the most recent results. We reproduce this figure 
from O’Dea and Preston (2011) for two reasons. First, to make the point that 
while the figures show qualitatively different results (the second quintile suffer 
the greatest proportionate loss in the 2010 version), we cannot tell whether this 
is due to changes in the modelling methodology, to policy changes between 2010 
and 2014 or to the extension of the modelling horizon. It would be useful if the 
UK Treasury, every time it produced a new version of their model, generated a 
set of results that show the old set of policies modelled using the new 
methodology. This would allow consumers of the research to assess properly the 
distributional impact of any new policy announcements.  
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The second point we wish to make in comparing the two graphs is that after the 
Spending Review in 2010, the Treasury released sufficient information for us to 
calculate what proportion of the changes in Departmental Expenditure Limits 
were being modelled and what were not. This allowed us to augment the 
‘average’ bar in Figure 2 with the impact of unmodelled expenditure. The 
Treasury no longer releases information that allows us to do this. This is 
unfortunate. Most of the spending items that are omitted from the model are not 
included as different households do not use the items differentially18 (e.g., 
spending on the environment) or because the extent of differential usage across 
household income groups either cannot be measured (e.g., for capital 
expenditure). In neither case is there a good reason to exclude the impact of 
change in spending on these items in the ‘average’ bar. Including it here means 
that the magnitude of the omitted items is clear, even if their distributional 
impact is not. At the very least, if the Treasury analysis is not to include this, it 
would be useful if sufficient information were published to allow external 
researchers to do so (as we previously were able to do). 
 
FIGURE 2 UK Treasury Analysis of Impact of Planned Cuts in Spending on Public Services, Between 2010/11 
and 2014/15: Model and Spending Plans as of Spending Review 2010 
 
Note:  As Figure 1. 
Sources: Data on modelled expenditure is from Chart B6 of Spending Review 2010 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/spending-review-2010). Unmodelled expenditure is from 
authors’ calculations using data from Spending Review Annex A and Annex B. 
 
Having undertaken the analysis lying behind the previous two graphs, the UK 
Treasury add those distributional impacts to those coming from their tax and 
cash benefit microsimulation model. Figure 3 shows the combined impact of 
 
18  This is perhaps a questionable rationale for omitting items. We return to this below. 
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changes to both modelled and in-kind net transfers. The lightest two bar sections 
here represent the output from the standard tax and benefit microsimulation 
model. The darker bar segments come from the public service spending module 
while the black line gives the net effect.  
 
The distributional impact of all modelled changes follows an inverted ‘U’ shape. 
Those in bottom quintile and the top quintile lose the most in proportionate 
terms, with those in the middle of the income distribution losing less. The 
composition of the distributional impact at either end of the income distribution 
differs – those at the bottom are losing mainly due to falls in spending on public 
services while those at the top are losing mainly due to increases in taxation.19  
 
FIGURE 3 UK Treasury Analysis of Impact of Cuts in Taxation, Benefits and Spending on Public Services,  
by 2015-16 
 
Note:  As Figure 1. 
Sources: Chart 2I, UK Budget 2014: Impact on households: distributional analysis to accompany Budget 2014, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/29373
8/budget_2014_distributional_analysis.pdf 
 
3.1 A questionable Rationale for Omitting Certain Expenditure? 
The model of the Treasury is incomplete as the distributional impact of much of 
government activity is not modelled. In particular, one important restriction is 
that they only value expenditure where usage of the service varies across the 
income distribution (though they are clear and transparent about this fact). 
 
19  This modelled benefit and taxation decisions includes some measures that were announced by the previous 
government but implemented by the current UK government. 
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The rationale for omitting items where usage does not differ across the 
population is not clear. There are two principal requirements for evaluating the 
distributional impact of public services. First, differential usage must be 
identified, where this is relevant. Second, conditional on usage, valuation must be 
assessed. The difficulties inherent in the first step (measuring usage) are avoided 
completely among those services such as defence and environmental protection 
where usage is (presumably) the same across the population. These are exactly 
the items which are omitted from the distributional analyses discussed here. Of 
course, the second requirement (measuring valuation) must be addressed, but 
there is no reason to believe this step is harder for items where usage is uniform 
than where it is not. 
 
In short, there is a danger in assuming that the methodology for valuation applied 
here (which assumes value equals cost, and that value is the same across all 
households who use the service) is any more reliable for public services which are 
used to a different extent by different households. Allocating defence spending 
or spending on environmental protection uniformly across all households could 
be just as good (or just as bad) as allocating other spending uniformly across all 
households who use them. 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
This paper has outlined the considerable difficulties in establishing precisely the 
distributional impact of changes to spending on public services as distinct from 
changes in rates of taxation and cash benefits. The difficulties come from three 
sources in particular: 
1. It is often not clear to what extent people with different incomes use public 
services differentially.  
2. It is not clear how much people with different incomes value the services 
they receive from the state, or to what extent they would be affected if the 
service is removed or curtailed. 
3. The link between any change in funding available to individual departments 
and exactly which individual services will be removed or curtailed will not 
always be clear at the time of the announcement of the cuts to departmental 
budgets. 
 
Each of these difficulties is either not relevant or substantially less acute when 
the aim is to establish precisely the distributional impacts of changes to taxation 
or cash benefits. This means that an evaluation of the distributional impact of 
changes to cash transfers can be undertaken with substantially greater precision 
than a similar evaluation of changes to spending on public services. 
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Despite these difficulties, existing research on public spending can inform an 
understanding of what effect the planned spending cuts might have. In countries 
where studies have been undertaken, use of public services (or at least those 
public services where ‘use’ can be defined and can be thought of as different 
among different households) is more concentrated at the bottom of the income 
distribution.  
 
This paper started by noting the importance of attempting to assess the 
distributional impact of changes to spending on public service. In light of the 
discussion around the work undertaken by the UK Treasury it is natural to ask 
whether we would recommend the development of a similar model for Ireland. 
The answer to this is a qualified ‘yes’. The ‘yes’ part of that answer comes from 
the fact that such a model would unambiguously increase the evidence base on 
the effect on households of Irish government action. It would facilitate a deeper 
and more complete understanding of the impact of successive budgets. However, 
the qualification to our positive answer comes from the fact that developing such 
a model would be a reasonably large job. Given the inevitable imprecision of any 
results (coming from the issues discussed in this paper) and the necessary caveats 
to their interpretation, it might not be the best use of scarce resources. A 
definitive assessment of whether such a model should be developed in Ireland 
depends on the opportunity cost of those particular resources. 
 
If such a model was to be developed, we make five specific recommendations 
relevant to the analysis.  
• First, we agree wholeheartedly with the UK Treasury Select Committee’s 
(2010) recommendation that “...the Treasury publish not just the sources but 
additional information on the calculations underpinning their distributional 
analysis to provide further transparency and encourage debate on how the 
methodology of such analysis might be improved” (paragraph 83). The type 
of analysis carried out is not one that has an established methodology (unlike 
the distributional analysis of changes to taxation and cash transfers) and, as a 
result, the credibility of the published results relies crucially on how they are 
derived and on the publication of same. 
• Second, care should be taken and explanation given regarding why certain 
elements of public spending (either on cash transfers or public services) are 
excluded from the distributional analysis. In particular, the UK Treasury only 
model the distributional impact of public services where differential usage 
across households can be ascertained. The case has not been made why their 
method of valuation is any more reliable for those services which are used 
differentially than those which are used to the same extent by all residents 
(such as spending on environmental protection). 
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• Third, in modelling the distributional impact of the provision of a particular 
public service (say health), use should be made of what research exists on the 
matter internationally. Results from other countries will not be exactly and 
immediately generalisable to Ireland, but, especially where that research 
relates to developed countries with similar demographics and a similar 
institutional framework, it will contain lessons that travel.  
• Fourth, in the event that a set of results is to be published that differs from 
the previous set of results in both the range of policies modelled and the 
underlying methodology, an evaluation of the old policies under the new 
methodology should also be published. This would allow the user of the 
research to distinguish what are the effects of the new set of policies and 
what are the effects of the methodological revisions. 
• Fifth, the many issues discussed in this paper imply that the results on the 
impact of benefits in kind should be interpreted cautiously. Any single result 
on the overall distributional impact of a package of spending cuts, whether 
produced by government or other authors, should be interpreted with care, 
and, while informative, should not be considered definitive. Alongside the 
publication of such results it would be good to see an assessment of how 
sensitive the headline result is to changes in the underlying assumptions. 
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